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19671 NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE 467
ARTICLE 2- LIMITATIONS OF TIME
CPLR 203(e): No relation back for amendment to include
third-party defendant.
In Trybus v. Nipark Realty Corp.," the original defendant in
a negligence action served a third-party complaint upon appellant
within three years after the accident. The appellant answered the
complaints of both the third-party plaintiff and the original plaintiff.
After the three-year statute of limitations had expired, the
original plaintiff was granted leave to amend his complaint and
serve appellant as an additional defendant. The appellate division,
second department,, reversed and held that the cause of action
asserted in the amended complaint was barred by the statute of
limitations. It was found that CPLR 203(e), which usually allows
an amended complaint to relate back to the time of the original
complaint, was not applicable since, here, the original complaint
did not give notice to appellant "of the transactions, occurrences,
or series of transactions or occurrences, to be proved pursuant
to the amended pleading. ' 2
The purpose of CPLR 203(e) is to abrogate the harsh effect
of Harriss v. Tams,3 which held that a claim asserted for the first
time in an amended pleading did not relate back to the service of
summons (for purposes of the statute of limitations) if it proceeded
upon a different obligation or liability from that of the original
complaint. 4  In CPLR 203(e), the New York legislature adopted
the "transaction-occurrence" terminology of Rule 15(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 In applying this rule, the
federal courts had looked principally to the specified conduct of
the defendant upon which the plaintiff relied to enforce his claim
rather than to the legal theory of the claim,6 i.e., if the defendant
126 App. Div. Zd 563, 271 N.Y.S2d 5 (2d Dep't 1966).
2CPLR 203 (e). The court also held that plaintiff's attempt to amend
was actually a statement of a new cause of action against appellant which
was barred by the statute of limitations.
3 258 N.Y. 229, 179 N.E. 476 (1932). This case caused "sophistic
distinctions between amendments that merely amplified the original pleadings
and those which imposed new liabilities." 7B McKnnny's CPLR 203,
commentary 83 (1963).
47B McKiN-EY's CPLR 203, commentary 83 (1963).
51 WEINsTE=n, KoRx & Mnatman NEW YoRx CivW PRAcTIcE ff203.30
(1965). Rule 15(c) states: "Whenever the claim or defense asserted in
the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence
set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment
relates back. . . " FED. 1. Civ. P. 15(c).
6 1 Wmxxsv_., KoRNi & Mna.m, Nmv YoRK Cvm PRAcTicE ff203.30
(1965).
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was notified of litigation concerning a given transaction, he came
within the purview of the rule.7
Although both CPLR 203(e) and federal rule 15(c) emphasize
the facts of the case giving rise to the original and amended
pleadings, it would appear from the language of both statutes that
the New York provision should be more liberally construed.
Yet, pre-CPLR cases had held that amendments to assert claims
against third-party defendants after the original statute of limita-
tions had run did not relate back. The federal courts, in
interpreting rule 15 (c), however, reached more liberal results. 9
In Tryb us, the dissenting judge would have applied CPLR
203(e) to the instant case since appellant, in actuality, had "notice
of the transaction" precisely within the language of this provision.
It would appear that, in cases such as Trybus, the purpose of
CPLR 203(e) should be to protect third-party defendants from
surprise. In order to effectuate this purpose, the New York
courts should adopt the federal interpretation of rule 15(c) and
view change-in-party problems as depending upon timely notice to
the ultimate defendant of the factual disputes that will be involved
in the litigation. What the court should do under CPLR 203(e)
is look at the original pleading and determine whether it gives
notice to the defendant broad enough to embrace the matter sought
to be added by way of amendment.
CPLR 203(f): Amendnwnt.
CPLR 203 (f) has been amended by the insertion of: "Except
as provided in article 2 of the uniform commercial code." Section
2-725 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides a four-year
statute of limitations for actions for breach of sales contracts.
This section states, inter alia, that where a warranty explicitly
extends to future performance of goods and discovery of the
breach must await performance, an action for breach of warranty
accrues when discovery is or should have been made. Therefore,
the effect of this amendment will be to retain the four-year statute
of limitations for breach of warranty from time of discovery and
not limit it to two years under 203(f).
7 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE [ 15.15, at 1022-23 (2d ed. 1965).
8 See McCabe v. Queensboro Farm Prods., Inc., 15 App. Div. 2d 553,
223 N.Y.S.2d 21 (2d Dep't 1961), aff'd without opinion, 11 N.Y2d
963, 183 N.E.2d 326, 229 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1962); Spen & Co. v. Ocean Box
Corp., 16 Misc. 2d 436, 184 N.Y.S.2d 152 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1959).
9See, e.g., De Franco v. United States, 18 F.R.D. 156 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
Here, a suit was commenced by one partner for a refund of taxes paid by
the partnership. Joinder of the remaining partners after the period of
limitations had expired was allowed since defendant had notice from the
beginning that a partnership claim for a tax refund was involved.
[ VOL. 41
